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Eve Brensike Primus

Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan:
Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures
abstract. Everyone knows that excessive caseloads, poor funding, and a lack of training
plague indigent defense delivery systems throughout the states, such that the promise of Gideon
v. Wainwright is largely unfulfilled. Commentators have disagreed about how best to breathe life
into Gideon. Many disclaim any possibility that federal habeas corpus review of state criminal
cases could catalyze reform given the many procedural obstacles that currently prevent state
prisoners from getting into federal court. But the Supreme Court has recently taken a renewed
interest in using federal habeas review to address the problem of ineffective attorneys in state
criminal cases. Last year, in Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court relied on equitable principles to
sweep aside procedural barriers to federal habeas review and permit state prisoners to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in federal court.
Not surprisingly, many lower courts have resisted the Supreme Court’s recent attempts to
permit state prisoners to have their ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims heard on the
merits. But this battle is far from over. After documenting the ways in which lower courts are
restrictively interpreting the Supreme Court’s recent decisions expanding the grounds for cause
to excuse a state prisoner’s procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, I
will suggest that the defendants still have an important equitable card to play. That card is the
idea of adequacy. As lower courts attempt to re-characterize state procedures so as to avoid recent
Supreme Court holdings that would open the federal doors to state prisoners’ ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims, they inadvertently set themselves up for challenges to the
adequacy of their state procedures. This shift is significant, I will explain, because of important
differences in how cause and adequacy arguments influence state behavior. Whereas cause
grounds are typically personal to the defendant, adequacy challenges are often used to expose
systemic failures in a state’s procedures. As a result, adequacy challenges have more potential to
catalyze change in states’ procedures.

author. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am indebted to Daniel
Lewin and Lauren Rosen for excellent research assistance.
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introduction
Everyone knows that excessive caseloads, poor funding, and a lack of
training plague indigent defense delivery systems throughout the states, such
that the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright1 remains largely unfulfilled.2
Although experts agree on the problem, there is no consensus on how to
approach solving it. Some argue for more funding for state defender
organizations or better training for defense attorneys.3 Others want to
decriminalize petty offenses to lighten defender caseloads.4 Still others believe
that judicial intervention is needed to effectuate change.5
One thing experts agree on is that federal habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions (as currently structured) cannot catalyze reform given the
many procedural obstacles that prevent state prisoners from getting into
federal court.6 The Supreme Court, however, has recently taken a renewed
interest in using federal habeas review to address the problem of ineffective
attorneys in state criminal cases. In Martinez v. Ryan,7 the Supreme Court
relied on equitable principles to sweep aside procedural barriers to federal

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to
_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter BROKEN PROMISE].
See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2009) (arguing that federal habeas corpus review should
be eliminated for most prisoners and the money saved should be diverted to fund indigent
defense delivery systems); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the
21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 90-92 (1995) (arguing for more funding);
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 70-71 (1997) (same); Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, National
Neglect: Realizing Justice Through Transformative Change, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 331,
333 (2009-10) (arguing for better training).
See, e.g., Robert C. Boruchowitz, Diverting and Reclassifying Misdemeanors Could Save
$1 Billion per Year: Reducing the Need For and Cost of Appointed Counsel, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1 (Dec. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Boruchowitz
_-_Misdemeanors.pdf.
See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense Crisis,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1 (Sept. 2010), http://www.acslaw.org
/files/Primus%20-%20Litigation%20Strategies.pdf.
See, e.g., Hoffmann & King, supra note 3; Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process
Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012); Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and
Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (2006).
132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
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habeas review and permit state prisoners to raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims in federal court.8 More specifically, the Court held that a state
prisoner who fails to properly raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim in the first state collateral proceeding in which it could be raised may
demonstrate cause to excuse his procedural default if he lacked effective state
postconviction counsel to help him raise the claim.
This Essay will discuss whether Martinez marks the first step down a path
toward reinvigorating Gideon. First, I will explain how the procedural default
doctrine made it virtually impossible for most state prisoners to have their
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims heard in federal habeas corpus
proceedings prior to Martinez. Then I will document how Martinez drastically
expanded the cause-and-prejudice exception to procedural default and, in so
doing, opened the federal doors to habeas petitioners alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
Not surprisingly, many states are resistant to expanded merits review of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. After documenting some of the ways in which states are
restrictively interpreting Martinez, I will suggest that their formalistic reading of
the Martinez holding may provoke habeas petitioners to file broader, systemic
challenges to the adequacy of state procedures. As states attempt to recharacterize
their procedures so as to avoid the implications of Martinez, they inadvertently
set themselves up for challenges to the adequacy of those procedures. This shift
is significant, I will explain, because of important differences in how cause and
adequacy arguments influence state behavior. Whereas cause grounds are
typically personal to the defendant, adequacy challenges are often used to expose
systemic failures in a state’s procedures. As a result, adequacy challenges have
more potential to catalyze change in states’ procedures.
In the end, whether through cause grounds or adequacy challenges, I will
argue that Martinez has started an important dialogue between the federal and
state courts about what procedures states need to have to give defendants an
opportunity to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights to effective trial

8.

These ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are often referred to as Strickland claims
after the Supreme Court case that initially recognized a Sixth Amendment right to effective
trial counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693 (1984) (holding that,
in order to prevail on a claim of trial attorney ineffectiveness, a defendant must show that
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that the attorney performed unreasonably
given prevailing norms of practice, and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the
defense, meaning that counsel’s errors were serious enough to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial).
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counsel.9 Whether that dialogue will result in more realistic opportunities for
defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state courts
remains to be seen, but the Supreme Court’s willingness to intervene when the
state courts prevent defendants from raising Sixth Amendment challenges is an
important first step toward ensuring that those rights are honored in state
criminal proceedings.
i. procedural default of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims
Federal courts have an arsenal of procedural barriers that they use to deny
almost all habeas petitions without ever addressing the merits of the
underlying claims.10 One of these barriers to review—procedural default—has
been particularly nefarious in preventing prisoners from having their
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims heard in federal habeas cases.11
Grounded in principles of federalism and finality as well as concerns about
conserving resources, the procedural default doctrine requires federal habeas
courts to respect adequate and independent state procedural grounds for
denying federal constitutional claims. If a state prisoner fails to comply with
the state’s procedural requirements for raising a federal constitutional claim
and the state courts refuse to address the underlying federal claim as a result,
the federal courts will respect the state rules and similarly refuse to address the
underlying federal claim.12
There are two exceptions to the procedural default doctrine. First, if a
defendant can show cause for failing to comply with the state procedural

9.

10.

11.

12.

Cf. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977) (explaining how federal habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions encourages an important dialogue between state and federal courts
about the scope of constitutional rights).
See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS
CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 45 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf
(noting that in forty-two percent of noncapital cases and twenty-eight percent of capital
cases, the federal district court dismissed the claims without reaching the merits).
See id. at 48 (noting that, in over half of the capital cases and nineteen percent of the
noncapital cases filed in district courts, claims had been procedurally defaulted); Martinez,
132 S. Ct. at 1323 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing statistics indicating that procedural
default accounted for the largest percentage of procedural dispositions for appeals in
noncapital cases).
See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).
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rule and prejudice to the outcome of the case, then the federal court will
bypass the procedural default and consider the merits of the underlying
constitutional claim.13 Alternatively, if a defendant can demonstrate that he or
she is actually innocent of the underlying criminal offense, the federal court
will look beyond the procedural default to address the underlying
constitutional claim.14
Many defendants seeking federal habeas relief on the basis of an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim run head-on into the procedural default
doctrine. In most states, defendants are not given realistic opportunities to
expand their trial records on direct appeal.15 As a result, claims that require
extrarecord development are typically reserved for state collateral review.16
Because ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are often predicated
on what trial attorneys failed to do, they frequently require extrarecord
development.17 Consequently, the first realistic opportunity that most
defendants have to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is on
collateral review. However, most states do not provide defendants with the
assistance of effective counsel for postconviction review. As a result,
many defendants fail to preserve their ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims in state court and face procedural defaults when they attempt to
challenge the effectiveness of their trial attorneys in federal habeas proceedings.
Until this past summer, the federal courts uniformly deemed these
defendants’ ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims waived absent a
showing of actual innocence. No federal court believed that the ineffectiveness
of state postconviction counsel in failing to preserve an ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim was sufficient cause to bypass a procedural default. After all,
the Supreme Court had held that “cause” requires a petitioner to “show that
some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to
comply with the State’s procedural rules.”18 The Court had further stated that,

13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).
See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 (2007) (documenting this problem).
See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734-36 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the federal courts
and the overwhelming majority of state courts refuse to hear ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims on direct appeal).
Ineffectiveness claims about what a trial attorney did that are clear on the face of the trial
record often require extrarecord development as well, because the appellate court needs to
conclude that the trial attorney’s decision was not a strategic one in order to find deficient
performance. As a result, testimony from defense counsel is often crucial.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).

2609

the yale law journal

122:2604

2013

under traditional agency principles, the actions of defense counsel are imputed to
the client such that mistakes by defense counsel are not “external to the defense”
unless the attorney error rises to the level of a constitutional violation.19 Only
when the state had failed in its constitutional obligation to provide effective
representation was there an “objective factor external to the defense” that
impeded the defendant’s ability to comply with the state’s rules. Because it was
generally understood that there is no constitutional right to counsel beyond the
first appeal as of right,20 the federal courts unanimously held that the
ineffectiveness of state postconviction counsel could not establish cause to excuse
the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.21
The federal courts’ unwillingness to permit the ineffectiveness of state
postconviction counsel to establish cause to excuse a default, coupled with the
practice in a majority of states of pushing ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims into state postconviction review where defendants do not have
meaningful representation, meant that most defendants had no realistic
opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. This was
particularly problematic given statistics revealing structural problems in
indigent defense delivery systems throughout the states.22 Defendants
were being convicted of crimes and condemned to prison having never
met their appointed counsel until the day of their plea.23 Trial attorneys
readily admitted that they did not have time to investigate their cases.24 Yet

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.
24.

See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991) (emphasizing that, while
constitutionally ineffective attorney performance is “imputed to the State” and thus
“external to the defense,” errors committed by an attorney who is not constitutionally
guaranteed to the defendant do not establish cause “because the attorney is the
[defendant]’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the
[defendant] must ‘bear the risk of attorney error’” (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488)).
Id. at 752 (“There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases establish that
the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”); Murray
v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (applying that rule to capital cases).
See, e.g., Livingston v. Kansas, 407 F. App’x 267, 273 (10th Cir. 2010); Wooten v. Norris, 578
F.3d 767, 778 (8th Cir. 2009); Pinkins v. Buss, 215 F. App’x 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2007);
Paffhousen v. Grayson, No. 00-1117, 2000 WL 1888659, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000);
Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1175 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
See, e.g., BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 7-28; Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of
Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 & nn.103-06 (2010) (documenting structural
problems in indigent defense delivery systems).
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html.
See, e.g., id. (emphasizing that public defender offices in several states refused to take on
new cases, citing overwhelming workloads that prevented them from effectively
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most defendants had no real opportunity to argue that their bedrock right to
effective counsel had been violated and that, as a result, their trial was
fundamentally unfair.
To make matters worse, the operation of the procedural default doctrine
meant that a defendant who had an ineffective trial attorney, an ineffective
appellate attorney, and an ineffective state postconviction attorney was less
likely to obtain federal review than a defendant who had an effective lawyer at
any of those stages. In short, the more ineffective lawyers a state prisoner had,
the less likely he was to obtain federal habeas review.
Maybe the perceived unfairness of this situation motivated the Court to
take action, or perhaps it was the inability of most defendants to ever challenge
their trial attorneys’ performance despite overwhelming evidence of structural
problems in indigent defense delivery systems in the states. Whatever its
reasons, the Supreme Court recently decided to relax the procedural barriers to
federal habeas review of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and give
federal courts a chance to review the merits of those claims.25
ii. the impact of martinez v. ryan
Martinez v. Ryan26 started as a seemingly inconsequential case. Luis
Martinez wanted to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but
Arizona law required him to wait until state collateral review proceedings to
raise this claim. Martinez’s state postconviction attorney failed to raise the
claim in the initial collateral review proceeding. As a result, when Martinez
later attempted, through new counsel, to file a successive state postconviction
petition raising an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the Arizona
courts dismissed his petition, noting that he should have raised the claim in his
first state postconviction petition. Not surprisingly, when Martinez filed a
federal habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the
district court held that he had defaulted the claim and that the ineffectiveness
of his postconviction counsel could not establish cause to excuse the default.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.27
Many were surprised when the Supreme Court took the case. After all,

25.
26.
27.

representing clients); State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993) (describing how public
defenders in New Orleans were too overwhelmed to adequately investigate and represent
their clients).
See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 1313-15.
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dozens of cases looked like Martinez, and there was no circuit split on the issue.
In fact, the Supreme Court itself had come close to holding that ineffective
performance by postconviction counsel could never establish cause. In Coleman
v. Thompson,28 it held that ineffective performance by a state postconviction
attorney in failing to file a timely state postconviction appeal would not be
sufficient to demonstrate cause. The Court emphasized that, “[i]n the
absence of a constitutional violation, the petitioner bears the risk in federal
habeas for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation.”29
True, the Coleman Court had reserved the question of whether it might reach a
different result in a case “where state collateral review is the first place a
prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.”30 But it had been twenty
years since Coleman was decided, and federal courts had consistently held that
ineffective performance by postconviction counsel could not establish cause.31
In Martinez v. Ryan, however, the Supreme Court capitalized on its Coleman
dicta and held that when a state requires its defendants to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims in initial-review collateral proceedings, a
procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial
claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding,
there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective under
Strickland.32 In that limited circumstance, the habeas petitioner will be able to
demonstrate cause to excuse his procedural default.
Justice Kennedy, writing for a seven-member majority, was clearly
concerned about precluding federal review of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims when the state itself had created a procedural system that
effectively prevented defendants from having an opportunity to raise the claims
in state court. In such circumstances, the Court noted, it would be likely that
no court would ever hear the prisoner’s claim.33 This was particularly troubling
to the Court given how fundamental the right to effective trial counsel is to the
operation of the adversarial system.34
Arizona’s system, the Court explained, may not provide defendants with a

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

501 U.S. 722 (1991).
Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
See cases collected supra note 21.
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
Id. at 1316 (“When an attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no
state court at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim.”).
Id. at 1317 (describing the right as “a bedrock principle in our justice system” and “the
foundation for our adversary system”).
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realistic opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in
state court. A state prisoner needs an effective attorney to raise an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim, because such claims typically require
extrarecord investigation and an understanding of trial strategy and legal
arguments.35 By choosing to locate ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims
in collateral review and, at the same time, failing to provide prisoners with
effective lawyers to help them raise the claims, Arizona was preventing its
prisoners from complying with the State’s established procedures for raising
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. That is precisely the type of
“objective factor external to the defense”36 that underlies the cause exception to
the procedural default doctrine.
The Martinez Court presented its ruling as a narrow one. For one thing, it
said that its holding was equitable rather than constitutional, noting that states
would therefore have the flexibility to choose between appointing initial state
postconviction counsel or defending cases on the merits in federal habeas
review.37 Moreover, the Court said that its ruling was limited to cases in which
(a) state law required ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to be raised
in initial-review collateral proceedings; (b) there was no initial postconviction
attorney, or the initial postconviction attorney’s performance rose to the level
of a Strickland violation; (c) the underlying defaulted claim was an ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim; and (d) the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim was substantial.38
Despite these cautions about the decision’s limited reach, the Martinez
Court’s expansion of grounds for cause to include ineffective performance by
initial collateral review counsel has broad implications for the majority of states
where defendants must wait until state postconviction proceedings to raise
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.39 In the wake of Martinez, these

35.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. (“The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply with the State’s procedural rules
or may misapprehend the substantive details of federal constitutional law. While confined to
prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of
ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the trial record.” (citation
omitted)).
Id. at 1324 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1985)).
Id. at 1319. The Court explicitly reserved judgment on the constitutional question. Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1318-19.
A handful of states have established procedures for expanding the record on direct appeal
and either require defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on appeal
or give them a choice regarding when to raise the claims. See Tweedell v. State, 462 S.E.2d
181, 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Ginther, 212 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Mich. 1973); Berget v.
State, 907 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Johnston, 13 P.3d 175, 178-79
(Utah App. 2000); Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 686-87 (Wyo. 1993). But see State v. Van
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Cleave, 716 P.2d 580, 582-83 (Kan. 1986) (establishing a remand procedure for
supplementing the record but noting that, in most cases, it is better to raise these claims in
postconviction proceedings); State v. Hosteen, 923 P.2d 595, 596 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)
(recognizing that a remand procedure is available but expressing a “preference for habeas
corpus proceedings over remand for an evidentiary hearing”). In the vast majority of states,
however, defendants must wait until state collateral review to raise ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims. A few states explicitly require prisoners to raise all ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims in state postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., State v. Spreitz, 39 P.3d
525, 527 (Ariz. 2002); State v. Dell, 967 P.2d 507, 509 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); State v.
Brouillard, 745 A.2d 759, 768 (R.I. 2000); Turner v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Va.
2000). In most states, however, the requirement is de facto rather than de jure. The state
does not forbid the claims on direct appeal, but it does not provide any mechanism for
expanding the record to substantiate the claims. Without the ability to supplement the
record, most defendants are unable to raise the claims on direct appeal. In these states with a
de facto requirement, the courts strongly encourage defendants to wait until postconviction
proceedings to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that require additional
development, and that tends to be the overwhelming state practice. See, e.g., Shouldis v.
State, 953 So.2d 1275, 1285 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (“[I]neffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims cannot be presented on direct appeal when they have not been first presented to the
trial court.”); McLaughlin v. State, No. A-10406, 2012 WL 1957981, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 30, 2012) “[W]e have consistently held that we will not consider claims of ineffective
assistance for the first time on appeal when the appellate record is inadequate to allow the
court to meaningfully assess the competence of the attorney’s efforts.”); Rounsaville v.
State, 288 S.W.3d 213, 217 (Ark. 2008) (noting that postconviction review is “the primary
vehicle” for raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73,
77 (Colo. 2003) (“In light of the considerations potentially involved in determining
ineffective assistance, defendants have regularly been discouraged from attempting to
litigate their counsels’ effectiveness on direct appeal.”); State v. Crespo, 718 A.2d 925, 937-38
(Conn. 1998) (“Almost without exception, we have required that ‘a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be raised by way of habeas corpus, rather than by direct appeal,
because of the need for a full evidentiary record for such [a] claim.’” (quoting State v.
Munoz, 659 A.2d 683, 695 n.16 (Conn. 1995)); McMullen v. State, 876 So.2d 589, 590 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“With rare exceptions, ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are
not cognizable on direct appeal. . . . Only in cases where the incompetence and
ineffectiveness of counsel is apparent on the face of the record and prejudice to the
defendant is obvious do appellate courts address this issue on direct appeal.”); State v.
Elison, 21 P.3d 483, 488-89 (Idaho 2001) (“This Court typically does not address claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the record is often not fully
developed on this issue.”); People v. Kunze, 550 N.E.2d 284, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“An
adjudication of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is better made in proceedings on a
petition for post-conviction relief, when a complete record can be made . . . .”); Lewis v.
State, 929 N.E.2d 261, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“A post-conviction hearing is normally the
preferred forum to adjudicate an ineffectiveness claim. . . . When the reasoning of trial
counsel is apparent from the record, the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be
appropriately addressed on direct appeal.”); State v. Schawl, No. 11-1471, 2012 WL 4097262,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2012) (“We generally preserve ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims for postconviction relief proceedings.”); Payne v. Commonwealth, No. SC–
0269–MR, 2005 WL 1412451, at *5 (Ky. June 16, 2005) (“We have held that an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must be raised in a post-conviction Rule 11.42 motion rather than
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on direct appeal, thus we decline to review the issue on direct appeal.”); State v. Vincent,
971 So.2d 363, 374 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is most
appropriately addressed through an application for post-conviction relief filed in the trial
court . . . .”); Mosley v. State, 836 A.2d 678, 684 (Md. 2003) (“[A] post-conviction
proceeding . . . is the most appropriate way to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”); Commonwealth v. Zinser, 847 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (Mass. 2006) (“[T]he
preferred method for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a
[postconviction] motion for a new trial.”); State v. St. John, 15 P.3d 970, 975 (Mont. 2001)
(“When the record does not provide the basis for the challenged acts or omissions of
counsel, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel more appropriately makes his
claims in a petition for postconviction relief.”); Webb v. State, No. 59711, 2012 WL 3055765,
at *3 (Nev. 2012) (“Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in
postconviction proceedings in the district court in the first instance and are generally not
appropriate for review on direct appeal.”); State v. Thompson, 20 A.3d 242, 257 (N.H. 2011)
(“[W]e maintain a strong preference for collateral review of ineffectiveness claims . . . .”);
State v. Preciose, 609 A.2d 1280, 1285 (N.J. 1992) (“Our courts have expressed a general
policy against entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because
such claims involve allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record.”); State v.
Stroud, 557 S.E.2d 544, 547 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (“In general, claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel should be considered through motions for appropriate relief and not on direct
appeal.”); State v. Koenig, No. 20090391, 2010 WL 1875694, at *1 (N.D. May 11, 2010)
(“We have previously cautioned that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should
generally be raised in post-conviction proceedings to allow the parties to fully develop a
record of counsel’s performance and its impact upon the defendant’s claim.”);
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002) (“Deferring review of trial counsel
effectiveness claims until the collateral review stage of the proceedings offers a petitioner the
best avenue to effect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”); State v. Carpenter, 286
S.E.2d 384, 384 (S.C. 1982) (“This Court usually will not consider [ineffective assistance of
counsel claims] on appeal from a conviction.”); State v. Thomas, 796 N.W.2d 706, 714
(S.D. 2011) (“Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are generally not considered on direct
appeal.”); State v. Mosley, 200 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (“Raising the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal is ‘a practice fraught with peril.’ . . .
The defendant runs the risk of having the issue resolved ‘without an evidentiary hearing
which, if held, might be the only way that harm could be shown—a prerequisite for relief in
ineffective trial counsel claims.’ . . . The better practice is to make an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding.” (quoting State v. Sluder, No. 1236, 1990
WL 26552, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 16, 1990); Wilson v. State, No. 909, 1991 WL
87245, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 1991))); Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“Rule 33.1(a) generally requires that a complaint be presented to
the trial court ‘by a timely request, objection, or motion’ as a prerequisite to presenting the
complaint for appellate review.” (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a))); State v. Gabaree, 542
A.2d 272, 274 (Vt. 1988) (“We have held that the proper avenue of raising the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for post-conviction relief, and not
through a direct appeal . . . .”); State v. McFarland, 899 P.2d 1251, 1257 (Wash. 1995)
(“If a defendant wants to raise issues on appeal that require evidence or facts not in the
existing trial record, the appropriate means of doing so is through a personal restraint
petition . . . .”); State v. Triplett, 421 S.E.2d 511, 522 (W.V. 1992) (“[I]t is the extremely rare
case when this Court will find ineffective assistance of counsel when such a charge is raised
as an assignment of error on a direct appeal. The prudent defense counsel first develops the
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states must spend time and money either (a) ensuring that indigent prisoners
have competent postconviction counsel, or (b) defending the adequacy of trial
counsels’ representation years after the fact. As Justice Scalia noted in his
Martinez dissent, the decision “will impose considerable economic costs on the
States,”40 particularly in capital cases and cases involving life sentences—cases
in which federal habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel
are a virtual certainty.
Some have suggested that Justice Scalia’s predictions about the burden
imposed on the states are overstated.41 After all, most prisoners are not in
custody long enough to file federal habeas petitions.42 For those who are, the
Strickland standard is very difficult for habeas petitioners to satisfy, particularly
when the deferential standards of review of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) are superimposed on top of it.43 As a result, states
may conclude that defending cases on the merits is easier and cheaper than
providing state postconviction counsel.44
That calculation, however, may be misguided. For one thing, it remains to
be seen how readily available federal evidentiary hearings will be to address
these claims.45 Hearings can be expensive and time consuming. Moreover, it is

40.
41.

42.
43.

44.

45.

record regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding before the
lower court, and may then appeal if such relief is denied.”); State v. Balliette, 805 N.W.2d
334, 341 (Wisc. 2011) (“The first opportunity after trial to raise the issue of counsel’s
ineffectiveness at trial is in a postconviction motion under 974.02.”).
132 S. Ct. at 1327 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 28.4(d) (3d ed. 2007 & Supp.
2012); Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2454
(2013) (calling Justice Scalia’s statements “absurd”).
See Primus, supra note 15, at 693-94 (discussing this problem).
See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (“The standards created by Strickland
and [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem,
review is ‘doubly’ so.” (citations omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689 (1984); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009))); see also King, supra note
41, at 2451-52 (emphasizing the deferential nature of the Strickland standard). AEDPA’s
deference will not apply to cases in which there was no decision on the merits in state court,
but state courts often deny ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on the merits when
the claims are raised and not substantiated with good evidence. If a pro se prisoner or a bad
state postconviction attorney raises the claim but raises it poorly (as often happens) and the
state court denies it, the state will get § 2254(d) deference on that decision in federal habeas.
See 7 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, § 28.4(d); see also King, supra note 41, at 2451-53 (arguing
that states will find ways to insulate their rulings from serious federal scrutiny and will resist
appointing counsel).
See 7 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, § 28.4(d) (discussing this question). Professor King has
gathered some anecdotal evidence suggesting that federal courts are still refusing to grant
hearings in these cases. See King, supra note 41, at 2434-35, nn. 22-24. However, given how
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possible that refusing to give state prisoners reasonable opportunities to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims will push the Supreme Court to
recognize the constitutional right to postconviction counsel that it failed to
recognize in this case. Alternatively, such refusal might encourage the Court to
look to other equitable doctrines to give states more of an incentive to provide
defendants with a realistic chance to contend that their Sixth Amendment
rights were violated.46
There is reason to think that the Court would be motivated to do
something to ensure that state prisoners have a realistic opportunity to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in state courts. Martinez is one in a
series of recent cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed the problem of
ineffective attorney representation in the state courts. In Maples v. Thomas,47
the Supreme Court relied on equitable principles to hold that a state prisoner
whose state postconviction attorneys abandoned him without notice thereby
causing him to default his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims could
establish cause to excuse that default in federal court. Similarly, in Holland v.
Florida,48 the Supreme Court held that grossly ineffective performance by a
state postconviction attorney could be the basis of a finding of extraordinary
circumstances sufficient to equitably toll AEDPA’s one-year statute of
limitations.49 Together, these cases send a strong signal that the Supreme
Court takes seriously the need for states to provide prisoners with adequate

46.

47.
48.
49.

recent the Supreme Court’s Martinez decision is, it is not surprising that the first published
cases to appear are those in which hearings are denied. Many of the cases in which a postMartinez hearing was granted or a case was remanded for consideration about whether to
grant a hearing are still open cases. See, e.g., Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2012)
(remanding for consideration in light of Martinez), reh’g en banc granted, 704 F.3d
816 (2013); Memorandum, Bilal v. Walsh, No. 11-1973 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28 2012),
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/paedce/2:2011cv01973
/411774/15 (granting a hearing in light of Martinez).
For example, states that continue to locate ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in
state collateral review but fail to appoint competent state postconviction counsel may face
systemic adequacy challenges to their state procedures. See infra Part IV.
132 S. Ct. 912, 924-27 (2012).
130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564-65 (2010).
The Supreme Court has also recently broadened its definition of what constitutes ineffective
attorney performance by extending Strickland into the plea bargaining process. First, in
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Court held that trial attorneys were
constitutionally ineffective if they fail to advise clients of obvious immigration consequences
that flow from plea offers. Then, in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), the Supreme Court declared that bad advice during plea
negotiations can give rise to a finding of trial attorney ineffectiveness if it deprives a
defendant of a favorable plea.
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representation to raise constitutional claims in state courts.
iii. the states’ reaction to martinez
Not surprisingly, many states have attempted to construe Martinez in ways
that limit their postconviction obligations. For example, the Martinez Court
was careful to state that its equitable ruling applied to states like Arizona that
“require[] a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in
a collateral proceeding.”50 Although there are a handful of states that—like
Arizona—explicitly require defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims in state postconviction proceedings, most states’ procedures are
not so clear.51 Many states without an absolute prohibition on raising
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal have seized on this
distinction to argue that Martinez does not apply to them.52
In Texas, for example, defendants are theoretically permitted to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal.53 There is no
explicit ban as there is in Arizona. As a practical matter, however, there is no
realistic mechanism for expanding the trial record on direct appeal such that
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that require extrarecord
development typically must be reserved for state postconviction proceedings. A
motion for a new trial is the only way to supplement the trial record before a
direct appeal, but defendants are given such a brief period of time in which to
file this motion54 that they often do not have time to retain new counsel, let
alone have that counsel investigate the case and draft and file a motion to
supplement the trial court record with information about the trial attorney’s
deficient performance.55 With respect to ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims that are clear on the face of the trial record, defendants are frequently

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012).
See cases collected supra note 39.
See infra notes 58-64.
See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Robinson v. State, 16
S.W.3d 808, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4 (requiring a motion for a new trial to be filed no later than thirty
days after the trial court imposes the sentence).
See, e.g., Robinson, 16 S.W.3d at 810 (“While expansion of the record may be accomplished
in a motion for new trial, that vehicle is often inadequate because of time constraints and
because the trial record has generally not been transcribed at this point. Further, mounting
an ineffective assistance attack in a motion for new trial is inherently unlikely if the trial
counsel remains counsel during the time required to file such a motion.” (quoting Ex parte
Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997))).
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represented by the same lawyer on appeal as at trial.56 Because an attorney
cannot be expected to raise his own ineffectiveness, the first practical opportunity
these defendants have to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel is in initial
collateral review proceedings. Finally, many defendants have ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims that involve a mix of on-the-record and off-therecord components. These defendants are better off waiting until postconviction
proceedings to present all of their ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in
the hopes that the cumulative prejudice from the record and extrarecord claims
will be sufficient to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement.
For all of these reasons, there is explicit language in Texas criminal cases
encouraging defendants to wait until collateral review proceedings to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.57 Despite this language, Texas is
now arguing that Martinez does not apply to it because, unlike in Arizona,
defendants in Texas are not always required to raise trial attorney
ineffectiveness in postconviction proceedings.58 Texas is not alone in making
this claim. Alabama,59 Arkansas,60 Illinois,61 Ohio,62 Tennessee,63 and
Washington64 have all convinced courts that they are not subject to Martinez’s
requirements because their state procedures do not facially require that all
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be raised in postconviction
proceedings. This formalistic reading of Martinez has the virtue of providing an
efficient and uniform rule for all defendants while avoiding a time-consuming,

56.
57.

58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

See Primus, supra note 15, at 711 (discussing this problem).
See, e.g., Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143 (“This Court has repeatedly stated that claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not successful on direct appeal and are more
appropriately urged in a [state postconviction petition].”); Robinson, 16 S.W.3d at 810
(“[B]ecause there is not generally a realistic opportunity to adequately develop the record
for appeal in post-trial motions[,] . . . we have noted that a post-conviction writ proceeding,
rather than a motion for new trial, is the preferred method for gathering the facts necessary
to substantiate [a] Sixth Amendment challenge. . . .”). See supra note 39 for a collection of
similar cases in other states.
See Gates v. Thaler, No. 11-70023, 2012 WL 2305855 (5th Cir. June 19, 2012). The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari to address this precise question. Trevino v. Thaler, 449 F.
App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 524 (2012).
See Arthur v. Thomas, No. 2:01-CV-0983, 2012 WL 2357919 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2012).
See Dansby v. Norris, 682 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2012).
See Weekly v. Hardy, No. 11 C 9231, 2012 WL 3916269 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012).
See McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 3:99-cv-140, 2012 WL 5303804 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 25, 2012); Sheppard v. Robinson, No. 1:00-cv-493, 2012 WL 3583128 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 20, 2012).
See Leberry v. Howerton, No. 3:10-00624, 2012 WL 2999775 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2012).
See Prokasky v. Glebe, No. C12-5134, 2012 WL 3877746 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2012).
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resource-intensive, and highly intrusive process of case-by-case analysis. But
these states’ attempts to opt out of Martinez’s requirements may not allow
them to avoid federal court analysis of whether their state procedures give
defendants a realistic opportunity to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims. Rather, the federal courts’ inquiry may simply be recast as a question
about the adequacy of the state procedures rather than a question about
whether there is sufficient cause to excuse a procedural default. Thus, states
like Texas that want to rely on wooden arguments to close the door on
Martinez cause arguments may inadvertently be opening an even larger door to
federal habeas review.
iv. the push toward adequacy doctrine
A state court’s reliance on a procedural rule will only bar federal review of a
constitutional claim if the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate
to support the state’s judgment.65 To be adequate, the underlying state
procedural rule must be firmly established and consistently followed, and it
must not be applied in ways that unduly burden the defendant’s exercise of her
constitutional rights.66
In states that successfully convince federal courts to adopt a formalistic
interpretation that exempts them from the expanded grounds for cause
announced in Martinez, habeas litigants may simply recast their arguments as
adequacy challenges.67 In states where defendants are de facto forced to raise
their ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in collateral review
proceedings without the aid of competent counsel, defendants could argue that
the state’s procedural scheme discriminates against their Sixth Amendment
right to an effective trial attorney by failing to afford them a reasonable
opportunity to ever challenge their trial attorneys’ performance.
There is precedent in the federal courts to support adequacy challenges
predicated on a state’s failure to provide effective procedures for allowing
defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. Oklahoma’s
procedural rules, for example, required defendants to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal and provided defendants with
the opportunity to ask for a remand for an evidentiary hearing to expand the

65.
66.
67.

See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
See Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009); Lee v.
Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).
Martinez himself raised an alternative argument in the lower courts that Arizona’s
procedural rules were inadequate. See Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 2010).
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trial record to support their ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims when
necessary. In practice, however, the appellate courts almost never granted
hearings despite frequent requests. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the state procedural rule requiring defendants to raise ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims on direct appeal or waive them was inadequate as
applied to defendants with extrarecord ineffectiveness challenges, because the
state did not evenhandedly provide all defendants with a fair opportunity to
raise the claim at that stage.68 As the Tenth Circuit explained,
[t]he practical effect of [Oklahoma’s rules] is to force [defendants]
either to raise this claim on direct appeal, with new counsel but without
the benefit of additional fact-finding, or have the claim forfeited under
state law. This Hobson’s choice cannot constitute an adequate state
ground under the controlling case law because it deprives [the
defendant] of any meaningful review of his ineffective assistance claim.69
Federal courts have also struck down procedures in Idaho70 and New
Mexico71 that required defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims on direct appeal but did not provide them with new counsel to do so.
The courts held that, because an attorney cannot be expected to raise his own
ineffectiveness, these states’ failure to provide defendants with the opportunity
to consult with new counsel similarly deprived them of any meaningful review
of their ineffective assistance claims.72
Although these adequacy challenges were raised in states that required
defendants to present ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct
appeal, a similar challenge could be raised about the lack of a fair opportunity
to present ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in states like Texas that
do not have that requirement. Martinez itself provides the framework for this
adequacy argument. The Martinez Court recognized that many states that

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

See Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1364 (10th Cir. 1994). There has been a substantial
dialogue since Brecheen between the Oklahoma state courts and the federal courts about the
adequacy of Oklahoma’s procedures. See, e.g., English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir.
1998); Berget v. State, 907 P.2d 1078 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); see also Sanchez v. Shillinger,
No. 94-8060, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 15374 (10th Cir. June 21, 1995) (applying Brecheen to
Wyoming’s procedures).
Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1364.
See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535-36 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1319; see also Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 535-36 (holding that Idaho’s procedural scheme
“effectively prevented [the defendant] from timely raising his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims”).

2621

the yale law journal

122:2604

2013

theoretically allow defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims on direct appeal have such abbreviated deadlines for filing new trial
motions to expand the trial record that there is not adequate time for attorneys
to investigate ineffective assistance claims.73 With deadlines of between five
and thirty days from the date of conviction,74 there is not sufficient time to hire
new counsel and have that counsel obtain a copy of the trial transcript,
investigate the trial attorney’s performance, and draft a new trial motion.
Because the opportunity to raise extrarecord claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel on direct appeal in these jurisdictions is illusory, the state’s
procedures for raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct
appeal fail to give defendants a realistic opportunity to vindicate their Sixth
Amendment rights to effective trial counsel and should be deemed inadequate.
Nor can these states rely on the fallback position that, if a defendant is
unable to supplement the record in that brief period of time, she can raise the
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in state postconviction proceedings.
As an initial matter, a state like Texas, where the opportunity to raise
ineffectiveness challenges on direct appeal is illusory, should be estopped from
claiming that it is exempt from Martinez because it allows defendants to raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal and then, in the same
breath, claiming that its procedures are adequate because defendants can raise
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in state postconviction. Adequacy, much
like cause, is a doctrine rooted in equity. If equity concerns motivated the
Martinez Court to hold that states had to provide adequate postconviction
counsel to defendants who were de jure forced to raise ineffective assistance of
trial counsel in collateral review proceedings for their procedural defaults to be
enforced in federal court, those same equity concerns should find a state
procedural scheme that de facto forces defendants to raise ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims in postconviction proceedings without the assistance of
effective counsel to be inadequate.
As the Martinez Court recognized, without an effective attorney, defendants
will not be able to vindicate their ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims,
because such claims often require extrarecord investigation and an
understanding of trial strategy.75 As a result, states that make a conscious
choice to move trial ineffectiveness claims outside of the direct-appeal

73.

74.
75.

See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2012) (noting that “[a]bbreviated deadlines to
expand the record on direct appeal may not allow adequate time for an attorney to
investigate [an] ineffective-assistance claim”).
See id. (recognizing that most states give defendants between five and thirty days from the
date of conviction to file a request to expand the record on appeal).
Id. at 1317.
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process—where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed—and then refuse to
appoint counsel to aid defendants in raising the claims in initial collateral
review proceedings are significantly compromising defendants’ abilities to file
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.76 Adequacy doctrine is designed to
address state practices that place precisely this type of undue burden on the
exercise of a federal right. Given that the right at issue is the fundamental right
to effective counsel, which the Martinez Court described as a “bedrock principle
in our justice system” and the “foundation for our adversary system,”77 the
federal courts should be particularly resistant to state procedures that prohibit
enforcement of the right.
A petitioner who successfully challenges the adequacy of a state’s
procedures may open a wider door to federal habeas review than a petitioner
who successfully establishes cause under Martinez. Whereas cause arguments
tend to focus on the individual circumstances of a habeas petitioner’s case,
adequacy challenges are often used to raise broad questions about the operation
of a state’s procedural rules. The focus of a cause inquiry is whether there was
some objective factor external to the defense that prohibited that defendant
from complying with the state procedural rule(s) in that case. In order to show
cause to excuse the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claim under Martinez, the petitioner must show that his initial
collateral review attorney was ineffective under Strickland (or that he did not
have a postconviction attorney) and that his underlying ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim is a substantial one. If he succeeds, there is very little
precedential value to the decision because it involves determinations personal
to his case. I do not mean to suggest that pattern and practice evidence of a
state’s behavior will be irrelevant to cause inquiries. If a habeas petitioner were
to show that a state engaged in a systematic practice of providing ineffective
appellate attorneys, that would certainly be relevant to the petitioner’s
argument that he was unable to comply with rules of appellate procedure.
However, in the end, the question in a cause inquiry would still be whether the
state’s practices had the effect of preventing that particular petitioner of
complying with the state rules. In short, the petitioner would have to show that
his appellate attorney was constitutionally ineffective.
In contrast, the focus under adequacy doctrine is on the state’s procedures.
As a result, a federal court’s ruling on an adequacy challenge often has broader
implications for the offending state than an individualized finding of cause in a

76.

77.

Id. at 1318 (“By deliberately choosing to move trial-ineffectiveness claims outside of the
direct-appeal process, where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, the State significantly
diminishes prisoners’ ability to file such claims.”).
Id. at 1317.
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particular litigant’s case. To be sure, there are occasions when a petitioner
asserting an adequacy challenge is claiming that an otherwise valid state
procedural rule was applied to his particular case in a way that unduly
burdened his ability to exercise his federal rights.78 Such as-applied,
individualized adequacy challenges look a lot like cause inquiries. However,
many adequacy challenges are facial challenges to the adequacy of a state’s
procedural rules across all cases or as-applied challenges demonstrating that a
state’s procedural rules are applied in ways that systematically burden
defendants’ abilities to assert their constitutional rights.79 For facial challenges
and as-applied challenges that reveal systemic burdens on the exercise of
federal rights, the question the court addresses is not personal to the
defendant.80 Rather, the federal court analyzes the relevant procedural rules
and asks whether the state is unduly burdening the exercise of federal rights for
an entire class of defendants. In the wake of Martinez, the Court has paved the
way for petitioners to argue that a majority of states have procedural schemes
that have the effect of preventing most defendants in the state from vindicating
their Sixth Amendment rights to effective trial counsel. Once a federal court
deems a state’s procedural scheme inadequate as applied to a class of
defendants, it paves the way for future petitioners from that state to walk
through the adequacy door and have their claims heard on the merits. Thus,
states like Texas may inadvertently be pushing habeas litigants down a path
that will lead to easier and faster federal consideration of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims than the cause regime established in Martinez.
conclusion
Whether a state prisoner has had a full and fair opportunity to have her
constitutional claims heard in state court has long been an important
consideration in defining the scope of federal habeas review of state criminal

78.

79.

80.

See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002) (holding that, although a Missouri state rule
requiring defendants to put all requests for continuances in writing was not facially
problematic, as applied to a defendant who was surprised in the midst of trial with the
disappearance of his subpoenaed witnesses, the application of the rule unduly burdened his
due process rights).
See cases collected supra note 68; see also Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal
Court Review of the Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243 (2003)
(describing the facial and as-applied variants of the unduly burdensome branch of adequacy
doctrine).
The habeas petitioner must, of course, show that his claims were defaulted because of the
faulty rule(s), but that is different from a focus on the individual circumstances of his case.
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convictions,81 and the right to effective trial counsel has long been considered
the most fundamental of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights.82
Unfortunately, it has also long been the case that a majority of states routinely
underenforce defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to counsel by erecting
procedural regimes that effectively prevent them from ever challenging their
trial attorneys’ performance.83 Martinez v. Ryan demonstrates that the Court
has noticed this problem and is willing to use its equitable habeas power to
begin addressing it.
Martinez may be the first step toward establishing a meaningful dialogue
between the state and federal courts about what procedures states must have to
give defendants an opportunity to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights to
effective trial counsel. If Martinez’s expanded grounds for cause do not send a
strong enough message to the majority of states about the need to reform their
procedures, the federal courts can use other, broader equitable doctrines—like
adequacy—to catalyze change. More habeas petitioners should raise adequacy
challenges to state procedural schemes that fail to adequately protect
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. And if adequacy is not a sufficiently
powerful lever, the Supreme Court has other tools at its disposal to address the
problem, including the possible recognition of a constitutional right to counsel
on initial collateral review. How far the Court is willing to go and how resistant
the states are to changing their procedures remains to be seen, but the Court’s
willingness to start this dialogue is crucially important. We will never solve the
indigent defense crisis if states are permitted to avoid addressing alleged
violations of the right to effective trial counsel. The first step toward
effectuating change is to ensure that the state courts see and have to address the
underlying issue.84 Perhaps then we can put some pressure on the Strickland
standard and begin to breathe life into Gideon.

81.
82.
83.
84.

See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
See Primus, supra note 15.
See Primus, supra note 15 (arguing that the best way to ensure that state courts address
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims is to move such claims to direct appeal and
proposing a procedural scheme that would give defendants realistic opportunities to have
those claims considered on appeal).
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